Dated: June 11, 1993.

Wayne S. Foren,

Associate Administrator for Investment.

[FR Doc. 93–14336 Filed 6–16–93; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8025–01–M

Kansas City District Advisory Council; Public Meeting

The U.S. Small Business Administration Kansas City District Advisory Council and its Springfield Branch Office will hold a public meeting from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Thursday, July 8, 1993 in the Kansas City District Office Training Room, 323 West 8th, suite 501, Kansas City, Missouri, to discuss such matters as may be presented by members, staff of the U.S. Small Business Administration, or others present.

For further information, write or call Mr. Kurt Mueller, Acting Advisory Council Chairperson at (816) 474–5200, or Mr. Richard L. Osbourn, District Director, U.S. Small Business Administration, 323 West 8th, suite 501, Kansas City, Missouri 64105, (816) 374–6760.

Dated: June 11, 1993.

Dorothy A. Overal,

Acting Assistant Administrator, Office of Advisory Councils.

[FR Doc. 93–14236 Filed 6–16–93; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8025–01–M

Oklahoma City District Advisory Council; Public Meeting

The U.S. Small Business Administration Oklahoma City District Advisory Council will hold a public meeting from 9 a.m. to 12 noon on Tuesday, July 13, 1993, at the Granny Had One Restaurant, 113 W., Harrison, Guthrie, Oklahoma, to discuss such matters may be presented by members, staff of the U.S. Small Business Administration, or others present.

For further information, write or call Mr. W. Bruce Robinson, District Director, U.S. Small Business Administration, 200 NW. 5th Street, suite 670, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102, (405) 231–5237.

Dated: June 11, 1993.

Dorothy A. Overal,

Acting Assistant Administrator Office of Advisory Councils.

[FR Doc. 93–14334 Filed 6–16–93; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8025–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

[Notice No. 93–1]

Halon Replacement Performance Testing

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This notice announces a proposed research program to develop performance test methodologies which would lead to recommended airworthiness criteria for the evaluation of non halon fire suppression agents/systems to be used aboard airplanes and rotorcraft, and solicits alternate approaches, test methodologies and criteria.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before August 16, 1993.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this notice should be mailed to: Federal Aviation Administration, Aircraft Certification Service, Aircraft Engineering Division, Technical Analysis Branch, AIR–120, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591. Comments may be examined in room 806 weekdays, between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m., except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John J. Petrakis, Aircraft Engineering Division (AIR–120), Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; Telephone (202) 267–9274.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to comment on this research and development program by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Comments relating to the environmental, energy, federalism, or economic impact that might result from adopting the test procedures in this notice are also invited. Substantive comments can include cost estimates. Comments should identify the notice number and should be submitted to the address above. All comments received on or before the closing date will be considered by the Administrator before proceeding. The research program outlined in this notice may be changed in light of comments received. All comments will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments in the Technical Analysis Branch, for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each substantive public comment concerning this notice will be filed in the Technical Analysis Branch. Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must include a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Notice No. 93–1".

The postcard will be date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of Notice

Any person may obtain a copy of this notice by submitting a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Public Affairs, Attention: Public Inquiry Center, APA–430, 800 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267–3484. communications must identify the notice number.

Background

The FAA participated in the "International Symposium on Halon Replacement in Aviation" on February 9 and 10, 1993. The symposium held in Reston, Virginia was sponsored by the Aerospace Industry Association (AIA) and the Halon Alternatives Research Corporation (HARC), and was well attended by industry, particularly airframe and powerplant manufacturers. The symposium focused on the aviation industries concerns over the eventual discontinuance of the production of halon. The terms of the recent Copenhagen amendment to the United Nations 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, agreed to by the United States and other developed countries, were to cease the global production of Halons in January 1994. The affect the termination of halon production would have on the aviation industry was discussed by five working groups: certification requirements, research and development of alternate systems, implementation of alternate systems, collecting halon data, and recycling systems.

The symposium's preliminary conclusions regarding alternate agents/systems were as follows: The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)/Joint Airworthiness Regulations (JARs) do not specify the use of halon for fire suppression, except for hand fire extinguishers in the cabin; no regulatory action will be necessary for the certification of new fire suppression systems; fire hazards and test protocols defining the performance criteria for fire suppression systems must be developed by FAA/United States Air Force (USAF) research and development (R&D) programs; and guidance material for

approving non halon systems will be developed from the R&D performance criteria. Furthermore, alternate agents must be evaluated for their effectiveness, toxicity, corrosion and ozone depletion potential.

In addition, the symposium recommended that the FAA issue a public notice soliciting input from all segments of the industry, on the specifics of defining performance criteria for halon alternate agents/systems, and to invite international industry and JAA participation.

Discussion of FAA Halon Alternative Program

The objective of the FAA's technical program would be to develop acceptable performance test criteria to facilitate the approval of non halon fire extinguishment/suppression agents and systems.

To date, all required fixed fire suppression systems aboard transport category aircraft have employed Halon 1301 ($CBrF_3$) extinguishing agent. System applications include engine nacelles/auxiliary power units (APU's), cargo compartments and lavatory trash receptacles. The FAA also requires these aircraft to carry a minimum of two Halon 1211 ($CBrClF_2$) hand fire extinguishers.

Thus far, the replacement agents developed by industry carry a weight and volume penalty of a factor of two or three times that of halon. Because of the weight penalty and increased cost, the airlines and airframe manufacturers are concentrating their efforts on the use of reclaimed Halon 1301 for as long as possible. However, the eventual unavailability of reclaimed Halon 1301 and the possibility of future regulations that may forbid its use amplify the importance of developing credible alternative agents/systems and reasonable certification criteria.

The FAA program would concentrate on the four application areas, engine nacelles/APU's, cargo compartments, lavatory trash receptacles, and hand fire extinguishers. The basic approach would be to use full-scale evaluation fire tests to study the impact of various parameters on the level of protection provided by alternative agents/systems. Subsequently, a minimum acceptable level of performance would be defined with the research results. Standard performance tests would be developed and validated for each application and ultimately used as the basis for approval.

Promising new agents and systems would be evaluated to determine their relative effectiveness, as compared to halons, and acceptability in specific fire protection applications. The approach and level of effort for each of the application areas is relatively distinct and independent because the fire threat and environmental conditions are different. Finally, based on the research, acceptable compliance performance criteria would be established and recommended for the approval of non-halon agents and systems in the four aforementioned application areas.

This program will be coordinated with an aviation authorities management team to oversee the technical requirements for the airworthiness regulatory authorities and to ensure coordination and harmonization of alternative agent/system certification compliance criteria.

The major tasks of the program would be as follows:

- Develop Test Articles
- Conduct Evaluation Tests
- Develop Minimum Acceptable Levels of Performance
- Develop Standard Performance Tests
- Develop and Issue Certification Compliance Guidance

Develop Test Articles

The building and instrumenting of full-scale test articles is necessary to perform proper evaluation fire tests. The full-scale evaluation fire test results would be used to form the basis for defining agent/system performance criteria. The full-scale performance criteria would be critical to deriving more simplified compliance criteria.

Engine Nacelles: An engine nacelle simulator would be designed and constructed at the FAATC. The simulator would be capable of varying the nacelle volume in order to approximate the range of volumes of engines used on narrow and wide body airplanes. A large fan would provide a variable nacelle air flow rate. In addition, the simulator would be designed for heating the engine casing in order to examine hot surface ignition. Obstructions would be mounted in the nacelle area to simulate the effect of line and equipment "clutter" on agent penetration and extinguishing effectiveness. To validate the new engine simulator and gain confidence in the data collected, comparison, tests, using B–737 parameters, would be made with the Aircraft Engine Nacelle (AEN) Facility at Wright Paterson Air Force Base (WPAFB).

Cargo Compartment: Existing wide body (TC–10) and narrow body (B–707) fuselages in the FAATC Full-Scale Fire Test Facility would be utilized as cargo compartment test articles. Standard cargo containers and test containers also would be available. Thus, test articles would be available to examine the range of sizes and shapes of present cargo compartments.

Lavatory Trash Receptacles: Trash receptacles representative of the current transport fleet would be used as test articles. These receptacles are available in lavatories which were used during the "hidden fire program" (ref. FAA Report DOT/FAA/CT 91/2). The receptacles would be from narrow and wide body aircraft and would include surrounding hardware and materials such as the trash entrance chute.

Hand Extinguishers: A test article would be developed to evaluate the effectiveness of alternate agents used in hand extinguishers as compared to Halon 1211. The fire hazard against which the hand extinguisher must protect would be a hidden in-flight fire. It is envisioned that the hidden fire hazard would be patterned after the in-flight fire which occurred on a trans-Atlantic Delta L–1011 flight on March 17, 1991. In this incident, Halon extinguishers were blindly discharged into air return grills, successfully extinguishing a severe electrical fire beneath the floor that was spreading into the cabin, and likely saving the airplane and its 231 occupants. Although Halon 1211 extinguishers were originally required by the FAA for fighting a seat fire accelerated by spilled gasoline (a hijacking scenario), it is anticipated that a hidden fire hazard criterium would be recommended and the extinguishment capabilities of Halon 1211 would be maintained as the performance standard for hand fire extinguishers.

The hand extinguisher test article would use a symmetrical half of a fuselage cross section or a modified existing fuselage barrel section. A test article also would be required to examine the toxicity associated with an agents use on in-flight fires. A series of tests are envisioned similar to previous Halon 1211 FAATC tests that demonstrated the non-toxic affects during typical in-flight fire extinguishment (reference FAA Report DOT/FAA/CT–82/111).

Evaluation Tests

As previously mentioned, full-scale evaluation fire tests would provide the data that would be the primary basis for the development of performance criteria for agents and systems. Therefore, the design of the various test series, as well as the agreed-to minimum acceptable levels of performance, would dictate the severity of the performance criteria. Most critical to the performance criteria will be the nature of the fire tests or fire

hazard scenarios these agents/systems would be required to protect against. The crucial task would be to define these hazards/scenarios. The question to be resolved would be whether the fire hazard/scenario should be a worst case condition or a more typical situation which may have a greater probability of occurrence. Designing to the worst case scenarios would lead to more expensive replacement systems.

Engine Nacelles: Engine nacelle evaluation tests must cover the range of nacelle design and operational parameters as well as potential accidental fire conditions. Nacelle volume directly relates to the total quantity of agent required. Therefore, typical narrow body and wide nacelle volumes would be examined. Air velocity in the nacelle is an important parameter, since it impacts both the peak agent concentration and the length of time the agent remains present. The minimum concentration over a one-half second is specified in Advisory Circular (AC) 20–100, "General Guidelines for Measuring Fire-Extinguishing Agent Concentration in Powerplant Compartments", dated September 21, 1977. Therefore, maximum air velocities through the nacelle should be created in the simulator during evaluation tests. As with any fire test, realistic and repeatable conditions are necessary. Jet fuel, hydraulic fluid and lubricants, as appropriate, would be utilized as fuel sources at maximum leakage rates and critical failure points. From previous experimental studies, it is known that the preburn time and the amount of obstructions, i.e. "clutter", are also important parameters. Actual engine casing temperatures also would be considered and simulated as potential ignition sources.

Selected alternate agents/systems would be evaluated with respect to their ability to extinguish engine fires and prevent reignition. The test results would identify those agents and/or systems best suited as Halon 1301 replacements. Critical design parameters would also be identified.

Cargo Compartments: It is envisioned that cargo compartment evaluation tests would be conducted on three configurations: narrow body (Class C), wide body (Class C) and wide body-combi (Class B). This should bracket the applicable Halon 1301 fire suppression systems used in cargo compartments. At least, three general types of alternate agents/systems would be used and their effectiveness and characteristics against cargo fires evaluated. The types would include a low boiling point gaseous total flooding agent, water fog and dry powder. The latter is a recent development with total flooding characteristics. System designers have claimed the powder remains suspended in the air for long periods of time. Candidate alternate agent/systems would be determined from these evaluation tests. Another potential solution is a hybrid system comprised of water spray for initial fire knockdown and nitrogen, generated from gas separation membranes, for prolonged inerting. However, this approach will require significant development.

Multiple fire scenarios would be employed to cover the spectrum of potential fire conditions. Cargo fires in loaded standard cargo containers would be compared with pallet cargo fires. The location of the fire amongst cargo stacked on a pallet is very important. Whether the fire begins on the periphery, on the top or bottom, or deep within the center of the cargo, affects the characteristics of the fire, and possibly compromises the effectiveness of the suppression system. Ignition of peripheral cargo tends to produce early flaming whereas ignition of buried cargo is smokier and takes longer to produce open flaming.

The type of detector(s) used has a bearing on the effectiveness of a particular agent/system. Also, for some gaseous agents, it may be more difficult to suppress a fire that originates at the top of cargo near the ceiling of the cargo compartment. These agents will settle to the bottom of the compartment with time.

Another important parameter would be the volume of air surrounding the cargo. Currently approved Halon 1301 systems are required to measure agent concentrations inside an empty compartment. Systems with concentrations that exceed prescribed minimum levels have been approved. However, the addition of cargo raises the peak Halon concentration level following agent discharge because of the reduced volume of air. With higher agent concentrations and reduced air volumes, the rate of agent loss increases because the volumetric leakage rate is constant and is a greater fraction of the reduced air volume. Because of these factors, it is conceivable that the duration of protection in a fully loaded cargo compartment could be less than indicated by agent concentration measurements made inside empty cargo compartments. At least, two cargo volumetric loading configurations would be studied at 50 and 90 percent capacity. Furthermore, the more highly loaded configurations would make it more difficult to provide complete coverage with agents that may not behave the same as a true total flooding agent, e.g. water fog and dry powder.

Lavatory Trash Receptacles: Testing of alternate agents/systems for use in lavatory trash receptacles would be conducted to determine the minimum quantity of agent necessary to completely extinguish a known fire hazard. The standard fire scenario would be a paper towel fire in a typical trash receptacle. Because it is important to develop a realistic and repeatable standard fire scenario, a fixed quantity of paper towels filling a typical size trash receptacle would be used. The ignition source would be located at the bottom of the container to simulate a deep-seated fire challenge for the alternate agent/system.

Hand Extinguishers: Alternate agents for hand extinguishers would be expected to be equivalent to Halon 1211 in terms of their effectiveness against hidden fires. A full-scale test article, as described earlier, would be used to evaluate alternate agents/extinguishers. Full-scale test results would be used to develop a small-scale performance test for appraising agent/extinguisher effectiveness against hidden fires. The performance test would form the basis for certification approvals.

A crucial and challenging aspect of the full-scale test article is the development of a realistic and repeatable fire hazard. In the previously mentioned L–1011 incident, insulation batting, electrical wiring, flooring, and sidewall paneling were heavily involved in the fire, and the accumulation of debris and contamination from years of service contributed to the fire spread. It is very difficult to attain consistent burns, or even sustained burning in some cases, with such an array of complex, fire resistant materials.

In order for an agent/extinguisher to be effective against a hidden fire, it must possess properties that promote agent expansion and penetration into voids and throughout empty spaces. Gaseous or low boiling point agents such as the halons, are highly effective against this type of fire scenario. Unfortunately, some alternate agents are more toxic than Halon 1211. Therefore, agents that are found to be effective against hidden fires would be evaluated under full-scale conditions for their potential toxic threat during inflight firefighting. Virgin agent and agent decomposition products would be measured and their toxic threat to humans would be calculated based on available data and models. A worst case fire scenario that maximizes the agent's toxicity would be utilized.

Minimum Acceptable Levels of Performance

Before or concurrent with evaluation tests, the minimum acceptable levels of performance would be established. Consideration of how this would be accomplished is discussed below.

Engine Nacelles: For Halon 1301 engine fire extinguishing systems, the FAA certification basis has been a flight test demonstration that shows a specified halon concentration level has been attained at all measurement locations over a specific time. Within this level of performance is a safety factor for the quantity of halon needed to extinguish engine fires. However, it is recognized that smaller quantities of halon will extinguish engine fires. Therefore, the issue to be resolved is whether the minimum acceptable level of performance of alternative agents maintain the same safety factor, which will need to be determined for the particular alternative agent used, or should the quantity of alternate agent produce the minimum concentration levels necessary to extinguish typical engine test fires.

Cargo Compartments: The level of protection provided by cargo compartment fire suppression systems using alternate agents/systems also would be expected to be equivalent to current Halon 1301 systems. Unlike engine systems, the goal in cargo compartments is to suppress the fire, because it is virtually impossible to extinguish a deep-seated cargo fire with a fixed system. What constitutes suppression is open to interpretation and would be defined. Does suppression mean the extinguishment of any initial flames with no evidence of open flaming over the duration of protection, or does suppression require that the allowable thermal exposure of cargo liners and protected flight-critical components be set at some minimum level, irrespective of the incidence of open flames?

Lavatory Trash Receptacles: The level of protection required of a trash receptacle extinguishing system would be the complete extinguishment of a deep-seated paper towel fire. The need for complete extinguishment, as opposed to suppression, is justifiable based on the possibility, probability, and past experience of passengers illegally smoking in lavatories and disposing their smoking materials into the trash chute. Before the ban on lavatory smoking, a survey revealed that the trash receptacles were being improperly used for disposal of smoking materials. At least one aircraft accident was caused by a lavatory trash receptacle fire believed to have been started by a cigarette (Varig, Boeing 707, Paris, France, 1973, 123 fatalities).

Hand Extinguishers: Of the four application areas for alternative agents/systems, the issue of toxicity of Halon 1211 hand extinguishers is of paramount concern. The level of toxicity allowed during the discharge of alternate agent hand extinguishers when fighting an in-flight fire would be established. The toxicity associated with the discharge of halon hand extinguishers originally was determined with seat/gasoline fire extinguishment tests conducted by the FAA. These tests demonstrated that the effects of human exposure to the virgin agent and its decomposition products were insignificant. Consequently, what this program would resolve is whether to require the negligible toxic threat to be maintained by alternate agents or to allow an increase in toxicity, but below a harmful level, to assure the usage of an as effective alternate agent as Halon 1211 in hand extinguishers.

Standard Performance Tests

Engine Nacelles and Cargo Compartments: A standard performance test for gaseous alternate agent suppression systems for engine nacelles and cargo compartments is considered to be impractical. As in the past, flight test measurement of gaseous agent concentrations would be required for each aircraft and engine model to assess the effect of variations in the protected volume, airflow rates (engine nacelles) and leakage rates (cargo compartments), as well as any other model-to-model variables. Although not a standard performance test, a cargo compartment or engine nacelle mockup of a particular model may be acceptable if the applicant plans to use a non-gaseous agent (dry powder or water) and is fearful of the possibility of agent damage to the aircraft or costly cleanup, especially if successive tests are a distinct possibility.

Lavatory Trash Receptacles: A test method for lavatory trash receptacles would be developed using the test article typical of a trash receptacle and the standard paper towel fire source mentioned above. The pass/fail criteria would be the complete extinguishment of the fire source.

Hand Extinguishers: A standard small-scale performance test for hidden fire extinguishment using hand extinguishers would be developed.

The test being considered would define the essential elements which are a controlled fire source, a port or grille into which the extinguisher is discharged, and a convoluted enclosed path between the discharge point and fire source. The design of the performance test would be patterned after the full-scale hidden fire test article. A correlation of test data with the two devices would be established. Once a prototype performance test has been developed the next step would be its standardization.

In general, performance test criteria standardization would be accomplished with public participation. If need be, round robin testing would be used to assure conformity of results.

Certification Requirement Guidance

The final product would be the development and issuance of specific certification requirement guidance for the approval of alternate agents/systems. In each application area, the goal would be to develop a basis for approving methodologies that are similar to what is currently being used for approving halon systems. For example, approval of gaseous agent systems in cargo compartments and engine nacelles/APU's would be based on measured agent concentration profiles and whether prescribed minimum values are exceeded during flight tests (non-fire conditions). The prescribed values would be largely based on the full-scale evaluation test results. Hand extinguisher approval would follow current practices with the additional requirement of passing a hidden fire performance test. The approach that would be used for the approval of non-gaseous agents, such as water and dry powder, is unknown and open for consideration.

Monitor Developments

The number of halon replacement agent activities outside the civil transport arena requires a concerted effort to monitor new agent/system development and evaluation. FAATC personnel will continue to participate in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) committees developing standards for Halon replacements. In addition, the activities of other government agencies, including Department of Defense (DOD), the Coast Guard and National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) will be closely monitored and, if advantageous, cooperative programs will be established. Also, laboratory tests will be conducted to screen prospective new agents before consideration of full-scale fire test evaluations. Agent toxicity, corrosiveness, and other potential problems will be addressed. It may become necessary to develop a test article and test method for surge tank explosion suppression systems.

Issued in Washington, DC, on June 11, 1993.

David W. Ostrowski,

Acting Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 93–14329 Filed 6–16–93; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee; GNSS Technology Subcommittee; Meeting

Pursuant to section 10(A)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–362; 5 U.S.C. App. I), notice is hereby given of a meeting of the GNSS Technology Subcommittee of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Research, Engineering and Development (R,E&D) Advisory Committee to be held Tuesday, July 6, 1993, at 1 p.m. The meeting will take place at the Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC, in the MacCracken room (round room) on the tenth floor.

The agenda for this meeting will include: Review and discussion of the proposed task statement; organization of the effort to develop a report and recommendations; overview of current FAA technology plans and schedules associated with the U.S. global positioning system. This subcommittee will attempt to ensure that the FAA's program addresses all the right technology issues.

Attendance is open to the interested public but limited to space available. With the approval of the Subcommittee Co-Chairmen, members of the public may present oral statements at the meeting. Persons wishing to present oral statements, obtain information, or plan to access the building to attend the meeting should contact Ms. Jan Peters in the Office of the Associate Administrator for System Engineering and Development, FAA/ASD–6, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, telephone (202) 287–8543.

Members of the public may present a written statement to the subcommittee at any time.

Issued in Washington, DC, on June 11, 1993.

Martin T. Pozesky,

Executive Director, Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee.

[FR Doc. 93–14328 Filed 6–16–93; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

Federal Highway Administration

Environmental Impact Statement: Johnson County, KS

AGENCY: Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of intent.

SUMMARY: The FHWA is issuing this notice to advise the public that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will be prepared for a proposed highway project in Johnson County, Kansas.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Johnny R. Dahl, Field Operations Engineer, FHWA, 3300 South Topeka Boulevard, suite 1, Topeka, Kansas 66611–2237, Telephone: (913) 267–7284; Warren Sick, P.E., Chief of Bureau of Design, Kansas Department of Transportation, Docking State Office Building, Topeka, Kansas 66612, Telephone: (913) 296–3525; James F. Pilley, P.E., Box 401, Courthouse, Olathe, Kansas 66061, Telephone: (913) 782–2640.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FHWA, in cooperation with the Kansas Department of Transportation, and Johnson County will prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for a proposed highway project known as the 21st Century Parkway. If constructed, the project would be primarily on new location and developed initially as a two-lane road (ultimately as a four-lane roadway). The study corridor begins at the existing K–7/Shawnee Mission Parkway interchange, passes to the east side of DeSoto, extends southerly along the west side of the Cedar Creek development and the Johnson County Industrial Airport, extends southeasterly to U.S. 169 north of Spring Hill, and then extends easterly across the southern part of Johnson County passing south of Stilwell and intersecting the State Line in the vicinity of 195th Street; a distance of approximately 57.9 kilometers (36 miles).

The project is intended to provide relief for projected traffic demands in western and southern Johnson County, Kansas. Several alternatives will be considered including the no build. Also incorporated into the study will be various alignments within the corridor.

One public information and two *Citizen's Group* meetings have been held to keep the local citizens informed of the study. These meetings have provided early coordination with appropriate Federal, State, local agencies and private organizations who have expressed interest in this proposed project.

Public hearing(s) will be held during the development of the Environmental Impact Statement. Public notice will be given for the time and place of the hearing(s) and where the Draft Environmental Impact Statement will be available for review and comment.

To ensure that the full range of issues related to this proposed action are addressed and all significant issues identified, comments and suggestions are invited from all interested parties. Comments and questions concerning this proposed action and the EIS should be directed to the FHWA, Johnson County, or the Kansas Department of Transportation at the addresses provided.

Johnny R. Dahl,

Division Administrator, Kansas Division.

[FR Doc. 93–14171 Filed 6–16–93; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–22–M

Federal Railroad Administration

[Docket No. RSAD–91–3]

Proposed Test Program to Evaluate Random Drug Testing Rate

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of second extension of test program.

SUMMARY: FRA will extend, for an additional 12 months, an experimental program designed to evaluate the extent to which the rate of random drug testing affects general deterrence. On July 1, 1991, three Class I freight railroads and one commuter railroad were allowed to begin testing at a 25 percent rate rather than the 50 percent rate required by FRA's alcohol and drug regulation. Three additional Class I freight railroads and one additional commuter railroad constituted a control group that continued to test at 50 percent. In the program's first year, positive test rates did not vary appreciably between the experimental and control groups. After extending the program for a second year, FRA has to date obtained an additional three quarters of data which continue to show no marked difference in deterrence between the two groups.

FRA believes that another program extension is necessary because the Department of Transportation is considering lowering the testing rate for its random drug testing programs for transportation employees. Extending FRA's experimental program for a third year would provide additional data for departmental study and could support future rulemaking activity.

DATES: (1) FRA intends to extend the current conditional waivers for one year effective July 1, 1993.